

REMARKS

Applicant has carefully reviewed the Application in light of the Office Action dated January 10, 2008. Claims 1-36 and 38-46 are currently pending. Claims 1, 25, 35 and 36 have been amended. New matter has not been added with the amendments to the claims. Applicant respectfully requests reconsideration of the application in accordance with the following remarks.

Examiner Interview

On February 6, Applicant's representative, Elizabeth Philip Dahm, conducted a telephone interview with the Examiner. Claims 1 and 36 and the cited art were discussed. The Examiner indicated that the amendments to claim 36 presented in this response would place the claims in better condition, but no agreement was reached.

Section 103 Rejections

Claims 1-8, 10, 12-15, 18-28, and 32-35 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 7,136,849 to Patrick ("Patrick"), U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0189693 to Kenig ("Kenig"), and U.S. Patent No. 5,977,969 to DiAngelo ("DiAngelo"). Applicant respectfully disagrees that the claims are unpatentable over the cited references.

Claim 1 recites:

- receiving an electronic document containing at least one predefined link selectable by a user;
- accessing a URL corresponding to at least one of the links presented for selection to a user;
- identifying a portion of the URL that corresponds to a hostname component of the URL;
- displaying the URL; and
- visually distinguishing the hostname component of the URL from other components of the URL.

The cited references at least fail to teach receiving an electronic document containing at least one predefined link selectable by a user and accessing a URL corresponding to at least one

of the links in the electronic document. Accordingly, claim 1 and its corresponding claims are allowable over the cited art.

Independent claims 25 and 35 recite limitations similar, but not identical, to claim 1. Accordingly, for at least the reasons mentioned in connection with claim 1, claims 25 and 35 and their corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 9, 11, and 31 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Kenig, DiAngelo, and U.S. Patent No. 5,961,591 to Jones et al. ("Jones"). Claims 9 and 11 are dependent on claim 1 and claim 31 is dependent on claim 25. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claims 1 and 25, the Patrick, the Kenig, and the DiAngelo references fail to teach all the features of claims 1 and 25. The Jones reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Kenig, and the DiAngelo references. Thus, claims 1 and 25 and their corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 16-17 and 29-30 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Kenig, DiAngelo, and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0169685 to Kubala ("Kubala"). Claims 16-17 are dependent on claim 1 and claims 29-30 are dependent on claim 25. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claims 1 and 25, the Patrick, Kenig, and DiAngelo references fail to teach all the features of claims 1 and 25. The Kubala reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Kenig, and the DiAngelo references. Thus, claims 1 and 25 and their corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 36, 38, 40, and 43-46 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Jones, and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0131060 to Hartselle ("Hartselle"). Applicant respectfully disagrees that the claims are unpatentable over the cited references.

Amended claim 36 recites "accessing a URL corresponding to a link presented for selection to a user, the URL including a hostname component and other components", "identifying at least one other portion of the URL that corresponds to other components of the

URL” and “determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of the hostname component and the other components.” As indicated in the Office Action, the Patrick reference and the Jones reference do not teach identifying at least one other portion of a URL that corresponds to other components of a URL and determining whether a URL is suspicious based on an analysis of an hostname component and other components (Office Action, page 10). The Hartselle reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick and the Jones references.

The Hartselle reference teaches providing electronic mail messages that self-destruct after a specified time period has elapsed (Hartselle, paragraph 0001). Prior to sending the described self-destructing message, the e-mail client application may determine whether any of the intended recipients are located on a network physically or logically beyond the sender's home e-mail domain (Hartselle, paragraph 0045). The Hartselle reference states that if the user's home e-mail address is “user@bellsouth.com”, the e-mail client application would determine whether any intended recipient's e-mail addresses are located at a domain other than “bellsouth.com”. Thus, the Hartselle reference does not teach identifying at least one other portion of a URL that corresponds to other components of a URL and determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of a hostname component and other components, where the URL includes a hostname component and other components. Instead, the Hartselle reference teaches determining if email addresses are associated with a domain other than a user's domain. As recited in claim 36, a determination of whether a URL is suspicious is made based on an analysis of a hostname component and other components of a URL. However, the Hartselle reference teaches a comparison of only domain names in two different email addresses and not an analysis of a hostname and other components of the same URL. Applicant submits that identifying whether one email address has a different domain than another email address is not the same as determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of a hostname component and other components of a URL. Accordingly, claim 36 and its dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 39, 41, and 42 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Jones, Hartselle, and Kenig. Claims 39, 41, and 42 depend on claim 36. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claim 36, the Patrick, the Jones, and the

Hartselle references do not teach all the features of claim 36. The Kenig reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Jones, and the Hartselle references. Accordingly, claim 36 and its corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited references.

Claim 42 was rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Jones, Hartselle, Kenig, and DiAngelo. Claim 42 depends on claim 36. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claims 36, 39, 41, and 42, the Patrick, the Jones, the Hartselle, and the Kenig references do not teach all the features of claim 36. The DiAngelo reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Jones, the Hartselle, and the Kenig references. Accordingly, claim 36 and its corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited references.

CONCLUSION

It is believed that all of the pending claims have been addressed. However, the absence of a reply to a specific rejection, issue or comment does not signify agreement with or concession of that rejection, issue or comment. In addition, because the arguments made above may not be exhaustive, there may be reasons for patentability of any or all pending claims (or other claims) that have not been expressed. Finally, nothing in this paper should be construed as an intent to concede any issue with regard to any claim, except as specifically stated in this paper, and the amendment of any claim does not necessarily signify concession of unpatentability of the claim prior to its amendment.

In view of the above, and for other reasons clearly apparent, Applicants respectfully submit that the Application is in condition for allowance, and requests such a Notice. Applicants hereby request a telephone conference with the Examiner and further requests that the Examiner contact the undersigned attorney to schedule a telephone conference.

This reply is being filed with a Request for Continued Examination. A fee authorization in the amount of \$810 for the Request for Continued Examination is being filed electronically. If any extension of time is required, Applicants hereby request the appropriate extension of time. Please apply any additional charges or credits to Deposit Account No. 06-1050.

Respectfully submitted,

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